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Spain is experiencing a period of intense social crisis.
by Blog Admin
The eurozone crisis has badly affected the Spanish economy, leading to rising
unemployment and large cuts in public spending. Vicente Navarro writes that the crisis has
now progressed into a frontal attack against the Spanish welfare state: already the smallest
(in terms of spending as a percentage of GDP) among the EU-15 countries. The
underfunded and under-resourced nature of Spain’s welfare state is leading to an acute
social crisis within the country, disproportionately affecting poorer citizens. 
Today we are witnessing a f rontal attack (and there is no other word to describe what is
happening) to the welf are states of  the countries of  the eurozone, which is especially accentuated in the
periphery of  this monetary union. In Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, we are seeing wage reductions,
increases in unemployment, dilution and weakening of  social protection, reduction of  public social
expenditures, privatization of  public transf ers (such as pensions) and public services of  the welf are
state (such as medical care, education, and social services), reduction of  labor, social and even civil
rights, and weakening of  collective bargaining and trade unions. All these public interventions represent
active aggression against the welf are and well-being of  their populations, in particular of  their popular
classes (working and middle classes). They are hurting a lot. In Spain, the suicide rate has increased
threef old as a consequence of  the unbearable stress among people who have lost their homes. Every
day, almost 500 f amilies are f orced to leave their homes because they cannot pay the rent.
All these policies respond to the
understanding held by the European
f inancial, polit ical, and media
establishments that the welf are state
in Europe is no longer sustainable. As
Mario Draghi, President of  the
European Central Bank, put it quite
clearly in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal: “The social European
model is not sustainable any longer.”
Mariano Rajoy, head of  the
conservative Spanish government, has
said the same, just using dif f erent
words: “We are spending in our welf are
state f ar above what we can af f ord.”
Spain, incidentally, is one of  the
countries in the EU-15 that spends the
least on its welf are state, at only 22
per cent of  its Gross National Product, compared with the 27 per cent average of  the EU-15. Only one
out of  every 10 adults works in the public services of  the welf are state (such as medical care, education,
and social services) compared with one out of  every six on average in the EU-15 and one out of  every
f our in Sweden, the country in the EU-15 that has the most developed welf are state. Regardless of  the
indicators one uses, the f act is that the Spanish welf are state is underf unded and undermanned. And,
with the cuts of  public social expenditure, the situation is getting worse. The average time f or patient
visits to their general practit ioners, in the National Health Services, has been reduced by 30 per cent
since the crisis started in 2007.
The 20 per cent of  the population with the highest rent, however, has not been af f ected by the
deterioration of  these public services, since they use private services, both in medical care and in
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education. They go to see private physicians when they are sick and send their children to private
schools. Social class is indeed an important variable in understanding Spain. The Spanish state (as well
as the Greek, Portuguese, and Irish states) is poor, with scarce social conscience and with limited
redistributive ef f ects, the result of  very regressive f iscal policies. And the cuts are weakening the
situation even more.
The causes of the crisis
There are three causes of  this situation in Spain. One is its history. The Franco dictatorship was highly
repressive and regressive. The Spain of  today is still the country of  the EU-15 with the highest number
of  policemen per 10,000 inhabitants and the lowest number of  adults working in the welf are state.
The second reason is the way in which Spain entered into the eurozone. The required reduction of  the
public def icit of  the Spanish state (stipulated by the Stability Pact) – f rom 6 per cent of  Gross National
Product to 3 per cent – was achieved primarily by cutting public expenditures (in particular, social public
expenditure) rather than by increasing taxes. Because of  the way the Stability Pact’s conditions were
achieved, the reductions of  the public def icit, which enabled Spain to become a f ull member of  the
eurozone, were done at the cost of  its welf are state. The revenues to the state that, during the period
1978-1993, had gone to reduce Spain’s enormous social def icit have, since 1993 (when major decisions
were made to reduce the public def icit), gone to reduce the public def icit of  the Spanish state. In this way,
the def icit on social expenditures has increased dramatically, reversing many of  the reductions that had
been occurring bef ore entering the eurozone. The popular classes were the ones who paid, through the
weakening of  their welf are state, the entrance costs into the eurozone.
The third reason has been the way the Spanish state has
responded to the crisis since 2007. During the housing
bubble (created by the alliance of  the banking and real
estate sector, the most speculative sector of  the Spanish
economy), state revenues increased because of  rapid
economic growth. The response of  the government to
this growth was to reduce taxes (in particular, corporate
taxes) in 2006. Those reductions created a hole in the
state of  more than 22 billion euros. When the crisis
started in 2007, the economy stopped growing and that
hole appeared in all its intensity, and instead of  f illing it in
by increasing taxes, it was f illed with savings achieved by
cutting public social expenditures. Examples are abundant.
The socialist Zapatero government reduced public
pensions (in order to save 1.2 billion euros). But, he could
have obtained more by retaining property taxes (which
had been eliminated and would have achieved 2.5 billion
euros). Later on, the conservative President Rajoy went
even f urther, cutting 6 billion euros f rom the National
Health Service. He could have obtained the same amount
by eliminating the cuts on corporate taxes of  large
corporations, which made more than 150 million euros per
year that he had approved previously. For every cut the
government imposed to the welf are state, there was an
alternative that was not even considered. The dramatic reductions of  public social expenditure (that are
clearly af f ecting the quality of  lif e of  the majority of  the population) have been accompanied by a higher
public assistance to banking (this aid represented 10 per cent of  the Gross National Product).
All these governmental policies were not in the governing parties’ electoral platf orms. There was no
popular mandate to carry them out. Quite the contrary, they are extremely unpopular. In the last f ew
years, there have been f our general strikes. Indeed, the popularity of  not only the governing parties, but
also the polit ical system, is very low, calling into question the legit imacy of  governments that are f orcing
policies on the population, policies that were never approved by those populations. The crisis of
democracy in Spain is a consequence of  the economic and social crisis.
A f inal point: The reduction of  public expenditures and salaries has created an enormous problem of  lack
of  demand. The population is deeply in debt (as a result of  the reduction of  salaries). This explains the
decline of  economic activit ies, f urther complicated by the austerity policies. Meanwhile, the most
prof itable sectors of  the economy are the speculative ones, such as the previously mentioned real
estate sector. Spanish and German banks have been the primary investors in these speculative sectors,
f acilitating the housing bubble. Today, German banks have loaned 200 billion euros to Spanish banks and
to the state. And the “rescate” (meaning the aid to the Spanish banks by the European Union) is money
that could enable Spanish banks to return the money owed to the German banks, with the Spanish
people paying the bill. It is not surprising that Europe is very quickly losing, at the street level, the
attraction that it used to have in Spain. Europe, which during the f ascist dictatorships led by General
Franco was perceived by the democratic f orces as the dream to be reached once democracy had been
established, has become a nightmare. The percentage of  people who want to leave the euro is already
30 per cent and growing. It has been the end of  that dream.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/ESPnav
 _________________________________
About the author
Vicente Navarro – Pompeu Fabra University / Johns Hopkins University
Vicente Navarro is a Prof essor of  Public Policy at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona,
Spain and also a Prof essor of  Public Policy at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, in the
United States. He has written extensively on the Spanish economy, the welf are state, and
the eurozone crisis. In 2002 he was awarded the Anagrama prize.
Related posts:
1. Spain is navigating through stormy economic waters, but the time f or f urther structural ref orm has
come. (8.8)
2. Five minutes with Luis Garicano: “We are in a downward spiral, and it cannot be solved without
ef f orts f rom Spain and f rom Europe” (8)
3. Spain’s economy needs bold leadership to prevent the collapse of  its banks and to ref orm its
labour market (8.3)
